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Abstract 
 
In this short comment to a recent contribution by E. Manousakis [1] it is 
argued that the reported agreement between the measured time 
evolution of conscious states during binocular rivalry and predictions 
derived from quantum mechanical formalisms does not require any 
direct effect of QM. The recursive consumption analysis process in the 
Ouroboros Model can yield the same behavior.  
 
 
One answer to the question posed in the title seems trivial and affirmative: as our 
total classical world is grounded in quantum mechanics’ realm, so are brains and the 
processes they implement. More interesting is the issue whether quantum 
mechanical effects are directly responsible for the working of brains and in the 
generation of conscious perceptions.  
 
In a recent contribution E. Manousakis claimed that experimental observations during 
binocular rivalry would provide support for a model according to which consciousness 
evolves as a quantum system including collapses of the wave function [1]. E. 
Manousakis proposes that in analogy to a quantum system in superposition “potential 
consciousness” evolves between “projections or measurements”, which eliminate all 
but one outcome. Combining quantum formalism with time constants obtained in 
psychophysical experiments the author is able to fit selected experimental data [2].  
 
There is no doubt that the reported agreement is remarkably good, but there is also 
no reason to infer from this that conditions of consciousness have to be equated with 
genuine quantum mechanical states. What can be asserted only is that some 
peculiar experimental results can be reproduced with a formalism akin to standard 
quantum mechanics. Any process featuring a suitable interplay between distinct 
phases with non-linear switching can successfully be described with the same 
formulas.  
 
Rhythms with rather different frequencies, some of them most probably nested, 
abound in the human brain. Conscious content appears to be binned into a grained 
time structure, delimited by about 30 Hz at the short end and 3 seconds as the 
longest duration of a perceptual unit [3]. Overall, the dynamical behavior and the 
occurring time scales can with relative ease be understood in terms of the 
macroscopic and classical (as distinct from purely quantum mechanical) 
characteristics of diverse neurons and their connections [4].  
Given the macroscopic time spans observed during binocular rivalry in the order of 
seconds there is no need for resorting to quantum mechanical effects to obtain fitting 
values.  
 
One model which can yield the reported behavior and which can partly be described 
with E. Manousakis’ formalism, is the Ouroboros Model [5]. It features a basic 
algorithmic structure for efficient minds. The following initially unconscious activity 
cycle is identified:  
 
... anticipation,  
action / perception,  
evaluation,  
anticipation,...  
 
Extensive evidence in the literature tells that all concepts are organized and stored as 
schemata, i.e. frames connecting specific constituents. In the Ouroboros Model 
activation at a time of part of a schema biases the whole structure and, in particular, 
missing features, thus triggering expectations. An iterative recursive monitor process 
termed ‘consumption analysis’ is checking how well such expectations fit with 
successive activations.  
According to the Ouroboros Model, during phases of ‘data collection’ different, 
possibly mutual exclusive, frames are activated; the system has not settled on one 
attribution. When everything fits into a coherent and consistent scheme, consumption 
analysis records the success and the selected interpretation, whereas the gathering 
of new data continues. Due to the boundary conditions dictated during evolution for 
avoiding endless considerations, the process ends in any case after a finite time and 
the best then available interpretation is accepted.  
In binocular rivalry, where it is not possible to arrive at one all-encompassing 
coherent perception, a second round would find less support from the features 
‘consumed’ just before and instead salient activations that have not been integrated; 
consequently the perception will switch after a certain amount of new evidence has 
accumulated. The implicated thresholds are modulated by many influences, ranging 
from random noise and the habituation of detectors to biases exerted by the context 
and attention as well as health and intoxication factors [2,6,7,8,9].  
Interrupting the visual stimuli to the eyes for some time disrupts the perception, and 
the process only continues as soon as its input is available again [10]. Thus, the 
effect of “freezing” of the temporal evolution can also be understood in the framework 
of the Ouroboros Model.  
 
Note that the expendability of direct quantum mechanical effects in explaining the 
observed behavior during binocular rivalry is independent of the arguments whether 
the internal working of the brain can at all rely directly on genuine quantum 
mechanical processes [11,12].  
The point here simply is that truly classical and macroscopic systems can embody 
algorithms which appear to mimic quantum mechanical effects and thus can be 
described to some extent using the same formalism. The Ouroboros Model offers 
one proposal how the reported perceptions and their alternations during binocular 
rivalry could come about.   
 
Just the same as for the paper by E. Manousakis, nothing of the above makes it easy 
to understand that activity in the brain “collapsed” into one single pattern should 
entail conscious awareness [1]. A detailed account of how the Ouroboros Model 
comprising Higher Order Personality Activation, HOPA, gives rise to subjective 
consciousness will be presented elsewhere [13].  
 
Returning to the original question asked in the title the answer advocated here is: no.  
 
 
References: 
 
[1] E. Manousakis, arXiv:0709.4516v1, 28 Sep. 2007 
 
[2] S. R. Lehky, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 259, 71-76 (1995) 
 
[3] E. Pöppel, Trends Cognit. Sci. 1, 56-61 (1997)  
 
[4] M. I. Rabinovich, P. Varona, A. I. Selverston, and H. D. I. Abarbanel, Rev. 
Mod. Phys. 78, 1213-1265 (2006) 
 
[5] K. Thomsen, http://cogprints.org/857/ ; presentations at TSC2005..2007 
 
[6] F. Tong, M. Meng, and R. Blake, Trends Cognit. Sci. 10, 502-511 (2006) 
 
[7] J. F. Mitchell, G. R. Stoner, and J. H. Reynolds, Nature 429, 410-413 (2004)  
 
[8] S. M. Miller, B. D. Gynther, K. R. Heslop, G. B. Liu, P. B. Mitchell, T. T. Ngo, J. 
D. Pettigrew, and L. B. Geffen, Psychological Medicine 33, 638-692 (2003) 
 
[9] O. L. Carter and J. D. Pettigrew, Perception 32, 295-305 (293) 
 
[10] D. A. Leopold, M. Wilke, A. Mair, and N. Logothetis, Nat. Neurosci. 5, 605- 609 
(2002) 
 
[11] M. Tegmark, Phys. Rev. E61, 4194-4206, 2000, (axXiv:quant-ph/9907009v2, 
10 Nov. 1999) 
 
[12] S. Hagan, S. R. Hameroff, and J. A. Tuszyński, Phys. Rev. E65, 061901, 
2002, (arXiv:quant-ph/0005035v1, 4 May 2000) 
 
[13] K. Thomsen, presentation at TSC2008, in preparation 
 
 
 
 
